The Term AInsurance@
Iidentifying the core features of Ainsurance@ is anything but a simple task. Indeed, Spencer Kimball, one of the leading insurance law scholars of the 20 th century, once wrote
AThere is no good definition of >insurance,= for any purpose.@ (Kimball 1992: xxv) . Kimball=s admonition notwithstanding, it is useful to begin by thinking of insurance as a formal mechanism for sharing the costs of misfortune.
Contemporary insurance arrangements typically involve fixed premiums paid in advance and guaranteed benefits in the event that a specified loss or event occurs, but these are not 2. Because the primary benefit of insurance is a sense of security that for most people will never be tested by a catastrophic loss, the value of insurance rests, in an important sense, in the 
Insurance as a Form of Regulation
Given the enormous size of insurance institutions relative to contemporary western economies, it is surprising that social scientists and historians have not paid more attention to insurance. Indeed, looking at the broad sweep of 20 th century social policy, it is tempting to describe insurance as the sleeping giant of power.
In setting eligibility requirements and benefit levels for social insurance, the state obviously is engaged in the regulation of populations. Yet, private insurance can also be a crucial form of (delegated) state power. Rather than set their own criteria for access to economic freedoms like operating an automobile or a business, states often mandate that a person obtain some form of insurance. Examples include liability insurance for automobile owners, workers compensation insurance for employers, and (in the United States) surety bonds for companies engaged in business with the state. The state leaves it to the private market B typically propertycasualty insurance companies B to set underwriting criteria that will determine access to these privileges and immunities (either by denying coverage altogether, or setting a prohibitively high price).
Motivated by controlling the losses they contracted to bear, insurance companies establish norms of conduct, which they enforce by contract terms and pricing and, ultimately, through the judicial system. Whether obtained as a result of compulsion or prudence, insurance is a form of regulation. Exclusions and conditions written into coverage for property, life, and health amount are a form of private legislation. Significantly, this Alegislation@ often acts inside the home or business, where the sovereignty of the King traditionally was expected to stop. (O=Malley 1991)
Insurance as Tort Regulation
The field of law most thoroughly dominated by insurance is tort law. In analyzing the relationship between insurance and tort law, it is helpful to distinguish between liability insurance and other forms of insurance, such as life, health or property insurance.
Liability insurance pays the costs of claims made against the insured person, and its regulatory effects on the tort field include the following:
S Liability insurance has become a de facto element of tort liability, at least for ordinary individual or small business defendants (because it is so difficult to collect money damages from someone without insurance). This means that liability insurers (and statutory insurance regimes) decide, in effect, who is capable of being sued, for what wrongs, and for how much. S Liability insurance makes lawsuits against ordinary individuals into repeat player lawsuits on the defense side, making tort law-in-action more focused on managing aggregate costs and less focused on the fault of individual defendants.
S
Insurance personnel transform complex tort rules into simple A rules of thumb.@ (Ross 1970) The regulatory effects produced by other forms of insurance include the following: S Liability is commonly limited whenever a statutory insurance regime is established. This not only creates bar on certain types of tort claims, it also leads plaintiffs to shape their claims to avoid the tort bar, thereby shaping the tort system.
People may be less likely to sue in tort when they have health, disability, or property insurance covering an injury (depressing the aggregate of tort damages).
In jurisdictions that deduct health or other insurance payments from tort damages, the existence of that insurance reduces tort damages.
Perhaps paradoxically, the existence of first party insurance can in some cases increase tort damages, by reducing the immediate financial need that might otherwise force the plaintiff to settle cheaply and quickly.
Insurance has also exerted an ideological effect on tort law. The existence of liability insurance helped make it possible to conceive of tort law as a risk spreading system B indeed, as a form of insurance B rather than simply as a mechanism for determining right and wrong in individual situations. (Cf., Ewald 1986) This conception of tort law has had a variety of consequences over the last 100 years. These include: the simplification of tort doctrine; the elimination of common law exceptions to tort; and the partial replacement of tort law by statutory insurance schemes in jurisdictions such as Quebec, Israel and New Zealand. (Sugarman 2001) More recently, the conception of tort law as insurance has lent intellectual force to political efforts in the U.S. and Britain to cap damages and eliminate Acoverage@ for pain and suffering, on the grounds that the benefits provided by the tort/insurance system should mimic the (lesser) benefits provided by first party insurance. (Clarke 1998) 
Insurance and Governing Through Risk
The ideological effect of insurance on tort law illustrates a more general phenomenon, namely the role that insurance technologies, institutions, forms and visions have played in
Agoverning through risk.@ (Baker & Simon 2001) . Insurance institutions pioneered the use of formal considerations of risk to direct organizational strategy and resources. Moreover, the actuarial techniques adopted by a wide range of institutions, from police departments to social service agencies and money management all depend upon thinking about the world in the probabilistic, demographic manner that insurance helped make possible. (Ewald 1986 ).
For most of the 20 th century the dominant form of governing through risk was spreading risk , as insurance institutions increasingly assumed financial responsibility for risks faced by individuals, families and organizations. More recently, both public and private insurance institutions may be placing a greater emphasis on individual responsibility B embracing risk.
The governmental rationalities inherent in spreading or embracing risk have significant consequences for law. Spreading risk leads to the simplification and expansion of tort law, more expansive interpretations of the statutes regulating social insurance and the contracts regulating private insurance, and, in general, more efforts to round the hard corners of life. Embracing risk leads to reductions in social insurance benefits, deductibles and benefit caps in private insurance, and links between pension benefits and market performance.
Insurance Law
Traditionally, legal scholars have divided the field of insurance law into two parts: (1) the law concerning the relationship between private insurance organizations and their insureds, which is considered a part of contract law; and (2) the law concerning the state regulation of private insurance organizations, which is considered a part of the law of regulated industries.
(E.g., Clarke 1997 , Cousy 1999 , Jerry 1996 , Schimikowski 1999 . A broader view of insurance law should include the law relating to social insurance, but the division of topics in this Encyclopedia reflects the traditional view; thus, the law regarding social insurance is addressed in Social insurance, legal aspects.
Insurance as a Species of Contract
Contemporary insurance institutions grew from two distinct roots: mutual benefit associations dating back to the medieval gilds (or earlier), and marine insurance arrangements dating back to 15 th century Italian city-states (and possibly earlier, e.g., Greek bottomry loans).
Early insurance law treatises report that courts treated both these forms of insurance within the framework of contract law, adjudicating the obligations of the company or society according to the promises made in the insurance contract.
At least by the mid 19 th century, courts in Europe and elsewhere recognized that insurance contracts differed significantly from what was traditionally understood as the ideal type of contract (a voluntary agreement, with terms that were negotiated between two parties with equal bargaining power). Because of the gatekeeper role of insurance institutions, insurance can hardly be said to be voluntary in many instances. Insurance companies almost universally employ standard form contracts with terms that are not subject to negotiation. And, in all but a very few cases, the parties do not have equal bargaining power. Typically, the insurance company is a much larger economic entity; competing insurance companies rarely offer significantly different terms (except sometimes price); and the insurance company has information about the meaning and value of the contract that the applicant for insurance does not. Recently, the federal legislature and judicial system in the United States has acted to shift an increasingly large portion of the health insurance market away from a private contract regime to a not-yet-stable amalgamation of contract, trust and administrative law. As private health insurance markets grow in Europe and elsewhere, there are likely to be similar efforts to create a paternalistic, yet market-oriented, legal regime governing the relationship between insurance companies and their members.
Insurance as a Regulated Industry
Contemporary insurance regulation dates to the 19 th century, when a rash of insurance insolvencies in the U.S. and Europe led to the establishment of state regulatory authorities.
States limited the kinds of investments insurance organizations were permitted to make, and mandated the employment of actuaries to calculate rates and reserves, the filing of reports with state agencies, and minimum capital reserves.
In economic terms, the justifications for these and more recent forms of insurance Understanding insurance as an institution for storing and accumulating capital, it is no surprise to learn that insurance firms compete with banking and securities firms. Yet, banking, insurance and securities have traditionally been subject to different regulatory regimes. The contemporary Aconvergence@ of the insurance, banking and securities industries in the financial services marketplace places great strain on the existing regulatory institutions, as they struggle with each other and the firms they regulate, both to achieve regulatory ends and maintain regulatory authority. (Jackson 1999) . Convergence and the related trend toward globalization will likely be the primary economic forces driving the evolution of insurance regulation in the foreseeable future. This evolution will address such fundamental issues as whether and to what extent there will be democratic control over capital and the proper level of governmental control (local, federal or international) over regulatory decisions. 
